Digital Physics

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New Scientist article on new work by Deutsch

Parallel universes make quantum sense

19 September 2007 NewScientist.com

by Zeeya Merali -- If you think of yourself as unique, think again.
The days when physicists could ignore the concept of parallel
universes may have come to an end. If that doesn't send a shudder down
your spine, think of it this way: our world is just one of many. You
are just one version of many.

David Deutsch at the University of Oxford and colleagues have shown
that key equations of quantum mechanics arise from the mathematics of
parallel universes. "This work will go down as one of the most
important developments in the history of science," says Andy Albrecht,
a physicist at the University of California at Davis. In one parallel
universe, at least, it will - whether it does in our one remains to be
seen.

The "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics was proposed 50
years ago by Hugh Everett, a graduate student at Princeton University.
Rather than apply one set of rules to the subatomic quantum world and
another to the larger-scale everyday world, as physicists tend to do,
Everett wanted to apply quantum mechanical equations to everything.
This had some startling consequences.

According to quantum mechanics, particles do not have set properties
before they are observed. Instead, particles are described by "wave
functions" representing many mutually contradictory properties. It is
only when an observer measures a property that the particle somehow
settles into one of these multiple options. The paradox is exemplified
by Schrodinger's cat - the famous thought experiment in which a cat in
a box can be said to be both alive and dead. It is traditionally
thought that the act of observation, opening the box to check the cat,
is what forces it to settle into a state, living or dead.

If, as Everett argued, quantum mechanics is applied to the whole
universe, then it too should exist in a multitude of separate states.
There would be a "multiverse" of parallel universes - one for every
physical possibility. So when you open the box holding Schrodinger's
cat, the universe splits, forming two new "yous" - one whose future
involves viewing the live cat and the other who sees the dead cat.

Dismissed by the scientific establishment as ridiculous for decades,
the many-worlds scenario may at last come in from the cold thanks to
Deutsch's work.

The biggest criticism leveled at many worlds was that it seemed to
make a puzzle about the outcomes of quantum experiments even worse.
Physicists can predict the probability of getting a certain outcome
from a quantum experiment from the square of its wave function,
according to the Born rule. Nobody can explain why this rule works, it
simply fits with experimental observations. The problem was there
seemed to be no place for the Born rule in the multiverse. In fact,
there didn't seem to be any space for any probabilities at all, says
Deutsch.
"You toss a coin, but what does it mean to say that the probability of
it coming up heads is 50 per cent?" Deutsch asks. "According to
Everett, both outcomes must happen."

In the mid-1990s, Deutsch set out to put the uncertainty we see in
quantum mechanical experiments back into the many-worlds scenario.
Now, with additional work by Simon Saunders and David Wallace, also at
Oxford, he believes they have succeeded. The trick is to examine a
quantum experiment while excluding probability theory and accepting
the many-worlds interpretation.

The multiverse has a branching structure, created as the universe
splits into parallel versions of itself. The thickness of the branches
can be calculated solely using deterministic equations, getting around
the uncertainties usually associated with quantum physics. What the
Oxford gang found is that the branching structure exactly reproduces
the peculiar probabilities predicted by the Born rule. The branching
also gives the illusion of probabilistic outcomes to measurements.

Deutsch believes this solves the problem of the origin of quantum
probability once and for all. "Probabilities used to be regarded as
the biggest problem for Everett, but ironically, they are now its most
powerful success," he says.

"We've cleared up the obscurities and come up with a pretty clear
verdict that Everett works," says Saunders, who is presenting the work
with Wallace at the Many Worlds at 50 conference at the Perimeter
Institute for Theoretical Physics in Waterloo, Canada, this week.
"It's a dramatic turnaround and it means that people now have to
discuss Everett seriously."

Albrecht agrees that the work will shake up physicists' worlds. "Many
people are uncomfortable about the probabilities at the heart of
quantum mechanics and attempt to get rid of quantum mechanics because
of it," he says. "But this greatly amplifies the fundamental place of
quantum mechanics in our understanding of the physical world."

David Papineau, a philosopher of physics at King's College London,
says that he has been converted from scepticism about many worlds to
belief, based on its potential to one day solve this puzzle of quantum
probabilities. He adds, though, that the work by Deutsch, Wallace and
Saunders must now be scrutinised. "It's an ambitious claim and so we
have to be careful," he says. For Papineau, the problem is whether a
belief in parallel universes should affect the way we live our
everyday lives .

Max Tegmark at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has long been
a fan of the many-worlds scenario. But while he believes the new work
on probability should help convince physicists of its reality, it will
never be enough to win over die-hard sceptics. "The critique of many
worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate it' to simply 'I
hate it'," he says.

David Albert, a philosopher of physics at Columbia University, New
York, is sceptical. He argues there is good reason to be wary because
the Oxford group may be guilty of sleight of hand. "When you first
hear about this you feel euphoric," he says. "But then you think,
maybe this is too good to be true." He believes that it is irrelevant
that Deutsch and his colleagues can show that branching universes give
the illusion of probabilistic outcomes to measurements. What we really
want to know, says Albert, is why this branching happens in the first
place. "They have answered a question, but I think it's the wrong
question," he says.

Wojciech Zurek at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico
believes that the Born rule is exactly the right question to tackle.
However, he believes that it can be answered without resorting to
parallel universes. Zurek points out that Everett never used the term
"many worlds" in his papers, and says that his work can be interpreted
in less controversial ways.

Zurek is also inspired by Everett's ideas, particularly his insight
that quantum mechanics must be applied to the entire universe rather
than a limited quantum realm. He interprets this to mean that quantum
entanglement - the process in which quantum particles can become
inextricably linked and act in unison no matter how far apart they are
- is a fundamental ingredient of quantum physics. Zurek has already
used this property to explain why we see a single objective reality
when we make a measurement of a quantum state (New Scientist, 30 June,
p 18). Zurek says that entanglement can also be used to derive the
Born rule (www.arxiv.org/abs/0707.2832). "I could not have derived
probability without using Everett," says Zurek, who is also presenting
his work at the conference. "But at no point am I forced to assign
equal reality to all other versions of the universe in the many-worlds
scenario."

For Tegmark, the fact that many worlds is sparking such debate, 50
years after its conception, is a triumph in itself. He believes that
physicists interested in quantum computing and cosmology are now
warming to it. Will the majority be won over? "That depends on what
parallel universe you live in," he says.

>From issue 2622 of New Scientist magazine, 19 September 2007, page 6-7

[Just another universe]

Like Schrodinger's cat, you're locked in a box with a vial of poison
gas. If a radioactive atom decays before someone opens the box to
observe you, the gas will be released. According to the multiverse
picture, in one future "you" will live, because the atom has not
decayed, and in another "you" will die. So, should you be worried?

The issue of how we should feel and act when faced with a constantly
splitting identity will be addressed by David Papineau of King's
College London at a conference on the many-worlds scenario in
Waterloo, Canada this week.

To start with, Papineau considers feelings of guilt and hope in the
multiverse. Suppose that you are driving recklessly and narrowly avoid
crashing into another car. "You might think 'lucky escape', but you
should be feeling guilty about the passengers your other self has
killed," says Papineau.

He also questions the use of hope. "You hope your football team will
win a match, but that's meaningless - they both win and lose," he says.
Although each of our descendant selves is equally real, thankfully
Papineau argues that their fates shouldn't affect our choices before
we make them. We should be just as reluctant, or excited, about
climbing into Schr?dinger's box in the many-worlds picture, as we
would be if we believed that only one outcome is actually realised.

Simon Saunders at the University of Oxford doesn't think that Papineau
is wrong, but does think he is asking too much of us. "The multiverse
will drive you crazy if you really think about how it affects your
life, and I can't live like that," he says. His solution? "I'll just
accept Everett and then think about something else, to save my
sanity."

Max Tegmark's new paper "The Mathematical Universe"

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0704/0704.0646v1.pdf

Interesting paper that is a follow up on the 1996 article that asked "Is the theory of everything merely the ultimate ensemble theory?" The technical parts of this one are going to be difficult reading for even many with scientific backgrounds.

conversation with an alien

http://www.station1.net/douglasjones/aconvers.htm

This link was posted in reply to my argument immediately below on the Everything List, and the first part of it provides some interesting speculations as to why simulated reality may be more prevelant than a "primitive physical" or underlying reality.

Response in support of simulation argument...

..that I posted today on the Everything List. MWI stands for the "Many Worlds Interpretation" of quantum physics. Ensemble theory is a theory that everything that can mathematically or logically exist does exist somewhere.

***************************************************

“I've no idea why we might be being simulated if we are being simulated. It is actually very arrogant to assume that we are somehow the centre of the simulation at all, like bacteria in my gut assuming that the universe, the solar system, humans were made for their benefit. “

Stathis Papaioannou

I have a problem with the very premise of asking why we are being simulated. Having been a member of this list for years, I have seen objections to the simulation argument raised repeatedly that are along the lines of “it is presumptuous to assume anyone would want to simulate us,” or “it is entirely speculative and not based in science”, etc. I have also seen a fair amount of discussion about how the simulation could be done.

To me, the logical chain is straightforward. If you accept a MWI interpretation or some other ensemble theory, then everything that can happen does happen. There is maybe a little wiggle room here, as perhaps you can have a MWI with an enormous number of universes versus and infinite number, depending on the nature of the underlying implementation, but as I understand it from earlier discussions and from my reading, most interpret MWI as requiring an actual infinity.

Now, after you have the MWI as the underlying foundation, there is really only one additional question that needs to be answered. Is there something fundamentally primitively “physical” and non-reproducible about my existence that would forever prohibit any attempt at reproduction? When I say “my existence” you have to include two possibilities. First, if you want to hold onto the “primitive physical” viewpoint you have to assume that there is something about the nature of our apparent reality in the third person that is simply not capable of emulation or simulation. Second, you ALSO have to assume there is something about our first person experience that is also not capable of emulation or simulation. This is where the “primitive physical” proponents lose me. I have thought about this a great deal, and just can’t figure out why I should assume there is something so special about my experiences, memories, and thought process that it under no circumstances could ever be capable of reproduction anywhere else in existence (other than the “naturally” occurring copies of myself in other parts of the multiverse, which are of course under this line of thinking occurring at a “primitive physical” level).

I am an attorney, so I guess I look at this at a little different perspective than most on here with science related backgrounds. I think once you get to a certain level, whether it be with MWI, or string theory or any other concept that can not be directly tested or observed, science loses its ability to take you further and you have to look into other areas such as logic and philosophy to finish the journey. However, there is a circumstantial case to be made for things even beyond strict science. For instance, I believe the circumstantial case for our universe being emulable or simulable is strong given what we know about how our universe works so far. The reasons for this have probably been discussed around here extensively, for instance the close relationship between math and physics, and our ability to describe the things we observe in mathematical terms.

To my way of thinking, the opponents to a simulation viewpoint are basically left arguing a concept that there is something “magical” or “spiritual” about human thought. That it is a supernatural function that is forever beyond the realm of science. Either that or they do not accept an ensemble theory. I could not disagree more with your statement that it is “arrogant to assume that we are somehow the center of the simulation.” On the contrary, what is arrogant is to assume that in a universe in which it is possible to simulate environments and universes (and this we know, just check out a Playstation 3 game I will say only partially tongue in cheek), is that we occupy a special location at the very top (or bottom depending on how you look at it) of this hierarchy of natural and artificial creations.

I think one thing that hangs a lot of people up on this concept is the idea that somewhere there IS a primitive, physical universe, and that we are just a digital simulation being run in that “more real” universe. This is NOT necessary nor is it part of my thinking on the subject. Maybe there is some “more real” or “primitive physical” reality out there that is simulating our entire quantum mechanical multiverse, but this is entirely speculative and presumably beyond the realm of any potential scientific discussion. When I refer to our being simulated, I am assuming the simulation is occurring in every way that is logically and physically possible in the multiverse, just as every other part of the multiverse is being likewise simulated in every way that is logically and physically possible in some other part. This is required, in fact is logically necessary if you assume it is capable of simulation.

That is as far as I think logic can take us. All the different theoretical ways that we can be emulated or simulated or of course interesting discussion. Why some intelligent beings in some other part of the multiverse may want to simulate or emulate our part of the multiverse is interesting as well, but is entirely unrelated to the logic of whether the entire entity is at least in part a simulation as set forth above.

Danny

Matrioshka Brains

From Wikipedia:

The possible uses of such an immense computational resource tax the imagination. One idea suggested by Charles Stross, in his novel Accelerando, would be to use it to run perfect simulations or "uploads" of human minds into virtual reality spaces supported by the Matrioshka brain. Stross even went so far as to suggest that a sufficiently godlike species utilizing enough raw processing power could launch attacks upon, and manipulate, the structure of the universe itself.
The theme of computers simulating human life is not new to the world of science fiction, forming central parts of the plots of such works as the Matrix film trilogy and the Star Trek: The Original Series episode "A Taste of Armageddon".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrioshka_brain

I came up with the name for this blog before discovering this excerpt, but it perfectly explains the meaning behind the blog name and the intended subject content for this site:

Without a doubt some of my favorite video games of all time have been those that involve simulations, including SimCity and The Sims.
When I play these simulations I fancy myself a demigod, managing and manipulating a wide array of variables that impact on the game, including the environment and the simulated inhabitants themselves. With each passing year these games become evermore realistic and their degree of sophistication is becoming nothing short of profound.
Recently, for example, a plug-in was developed for The Sims allowing the virtual inhabitants to entertain themselves by playing none other than SimCity itself. When I first heard about this I was struck with the vision of Russian Matrioshka nesting dolls, but instead of dolls I saw simulations within simulations within simulations.
And then I remembered good old Copernicus and his principle of mediocrity: We should never assume that our own particular place in space and time is somehow special or unique. Thinking of the simulation Matrioshka, I had to acknowledge the possibility that we might be Sims ourselves. Considering the radical potential for computing power in the decades to come, we may be residing somewhere in the Matrioshka.

- George Dvorsky
http://archives.betterhumans.com/Columns/Column/tabid/79/Column/269/Default.aspx